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Using a lcmma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freed- 
man. It is shown that the core of the matching ame is non-manipulable in a suitable sense by 
coalitions consisting of both men and women. A further strong stability property of the core is 
derived. 
Introduction 
In recent work on the matching model a lemma of Hwang was used to give a short 
proof of the non-manipu!ability theorem of Dubins and Freedman [2], [5]. In this 
note we give two other applications of this lemma; one is a stronger version 
of the Dubins-Freedman's re ult; the other one concerns a strong stability property 
of the core of the matching model. 
In the next section we recall briefly the matching model; in Section 2 we give the 
relevant earlier esults before presenting our non-manipulability theorem; the strong 
stability result is stated in Section 3 and proofs are gathered in the final section. 
1. The model 
As is usual, we phrase our result in terms of a marriage problem in which there 
is a set M of men and W of women. Each man and woman is assumed to have a 
preference list which consists of those members of the opposite sex which he/she 
would accept as a mate, listed in order of (strict) preference. A matching lU is then 
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a set of pairs {m, w}, m in M, w in IV, where each m and w occurs in at most one 
pair (the monogamy condition). An m or w occurring in no pair is said to be un- 
matched or self matched. 
If {m, w} is an element of /z  we will write w=/z(m) (w is the mate of m) or 
m =/~(w) (m is the mate of w); if m or w is unmatched we will write m =/z(m) or 
w =/~(w). 
The main concept of the theory is the following: 
Definitions. The matching/z is individually rational if whenever a couple is matched 
each member must appear on the other's preference list. 
The pair {m, w} blocks the matching/1 if m and w are not matched by/1 but prefer 
each other to their mates. 
A matching is stable if it is individually rational and if it is not blocked by any 
pair. The main result of  [3] shows that stable matchings always exist and an algo- 
rithm is given for finding one. The set of stable matchings i the core of the market. 
By way of terminology and notation we shall call the sets M and W together with 
their preference lists a preference structure, denoted by ~. The set of stable match- 
ings will be denoted by ~'  and the expression W-m w' means w is preferred to w' 
by m or w = w'. Further if/z and/1 ~ are matchings we write/z >__M/Z' to mean all men 
prefer/~ to/z' .  
An important but easily proved fact noted first by J.H. Conway is that the partial 
order defined by --M is a lattice when restricted to the set J .  As a consequence 
there are unique man-optimal nd woman-optimal stable matchings denoted by/tM 
and/z w respectively. 
2. The non-manipulability theorem 
In view of the above results it is rather natural to embed the matching model in 
a game in which each man and woman chooses as a strategy a preference list which 
may or may not give his or her true preferences. A stable matching relative to these 
preferences i then selected and this is the payoff to the players. The main results 
of this theory are: 
(A) The Theorem of Dubins and Freedman [2] which shows that if the man- 
optimal matching is to be selected, then no man or coalition of men can improve 
the outcome for all of its members by falsifying preferences. 
(B) The Theorem of Roth [6] which shows that any rule for selecting a stable 
matching in this game is manipulable (either by some man or some woman). 
(C) The Theorem of Gale and Sotomayor [4] which shows that if the man-optimal 
matching is to be selected then, except for the case where ~ is a singleton, it is 
always possible for some woman to improve her payoff by falsifying. 
In the present paper we consider the situation where coalitions containing both 
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men and women are permitted. In view of (B) and (C) above it may seem surprising 
that anything at all can be said in this case, but it turns out that if there is some 
'indeterminacy' in the payoff matching one can still prove a general non-manipul- 
ability theorem which has the Dubins-Freedman Theorem as an immediate conse- 
quence. Namely, suppose that some subset of men and women falsify their 
preferences giving rise to a new preference structure ~'  with stable matchings ~ ' .  
Theorem. For every lu" in ~g" there exists a lu in ~/t such that at least one falsifier 
is not better o f f  under p'  than under p. 
To derive the Dubins-Freedman Theorem consider the special case where all the 
liars are men. Then our result implies that no matter which matching in ~g' is chosen 
there is at least one of the liars who is no better off than he would be under the man- 
optimal matching of ~. 
3. The strong stability of the core 
In recent work on non-manipulability of markets, Demange [1] has defined the 
core of certain markets to be strongly stable if the following condition is satisfied: 
let a be an allocation some pair of which is not in the core. Then there exists a block- 
ing pair and a core allocation in which both of the blocking agents receive at least 
as high a payoff as they receive under a. Our second result states that the core of 
the marriage model is strongly stable: 
Strong stability property. I f  lZ is an unstable matching, then either there exists a 
blocking pair { m, w} and a stable matching ft such that: 
lJ(m)>_mP(m ) and /~(w)>__w/g(w) 1 (1) 
or lu is not individually rational 
Note that if/z is not individually rational someone, say a man m, is matched under 
/z with a woman not on his list so/2(m) >m/z(m) is true for any stable/2. 
By way of underlining the content of our result we note that it does not hold for 
the closely related Problem of the Room Mates. Namely, suppose four people A, 
B, C and D are to be partitioned into two pairs. Consider the case where A, B and 
C rank D third on their preference lists, A and B rank each other first and C 
prefers A to B. Clearly the only stable pairing is {A, B} {C, D}. Now the matching 
{A, D} {B, C} is blocked by the pair {A, C}, but C is worse off under the unique 
stable matching. 
t Note that we do not assert that m and w are matched with each other under/2. Thus, it may be that 
only one of  the inequalities of  (1) is strict. 
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4. P roo fs  
Our key result is a lemma (unpublished) which was formulated by J.S. Hwang 
and was proved in [5]. 
Hwang's Lemma. Let lz be any individually rational matching and M + be all men 
who are better o f f  under lZ than under lZ g.  I f  M + is not empty, there is a pair 
{m, w} which blocks p such that m is in M-M + and w in p(M+). 
Remark that the pair {m, w} satisfies: 
tzM(m)>_mP(m ) and lZM(W)>>_wP(W ). (2) 
Indeed, the first statement just says that m is in M-M+;  as for the second one, 
since w is in/z(M +) we have w=p(m')>m, PM(m') so PM(W)>_wP(W) by stability 
of PM. 
4.1. Proof  o f  the non-manipulability heorem 
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that some non-empty subset M 'U  W' of men 
and women falsify and are strictly better off under some/z in ~ '  than under any 
stable matching of ~ .  Then 
lz(m) > m lZg(m) 
u(W)>wUw(w) 
Suppose first 
under/z with a 
contradicts (3). 
Assume now 
for every m in M', 
for every w in W'. 
and 
(3) 
/t is not individually rational; then someone, say a man, is matched 
woman not on his true list so he is surely a liar and is in M':  this 
/a individually rational; if M'  is not empty, we can apply Hwang's 
lemma since by (3) M'  is a subset of M+; thus there is a pair {m, w} which blocks 
p such that (2) holds; surely m and w are not in M 'U  W' and therefore are not fal- 
sifying so they will also block/a under ~ '  contradicting that bt is in A". If M'  is 
empty, W' is not and the symmetrical argument applies. 
4.2. Proof o f  the strong stability o f  the core 
We proceed with the proof of the proposition which though not very long is rather 
'intense'. It would be nice to find a simpler argument. We use the following result 
proved in [5] and [7]. 
Lemma 2. The set o f  men and women who are unmatched is the same for  any stable 
matching. 
Assume that p is individually rational and note that from Hwang's lemma, we 
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need only consider the case where lz <--MPM. Namely, if the condition was not satis- 
fied, the set M ÷ would be non-empty and the blocking pair {m, w} would satisfy 
(2), so (1) would be true with {m, w} and/~=pM. Henceforth we may therefore 
assume: 
]LI<~M].I M and symmetrically p<_w/Uw. (4) 
Now the set of stable matchings/z' such that IU'>MP is non-empty since it con- 
tains/zM, and it is clearly a sublattice of ~/so  has a smallest element p*. We can 
now further restrict our consideration to the case where 
P*<-wP (5) 
for if p*(w)>wp(w) for some w, then (p*(w), w) and p* satisfy (1). 
We now define a new preference structure ~ '  as follows: 
Each w who is matched under the stable matchings deletes from (6) 
her preference list all rn such that rn<wlZ*(w). 
If lu*(W)<wlU(w ), then lu*(w) is also deleted. (7) 
Clearly (7) must hold for some w for if not we would have/z =p*. 
Now let/z~, be the man-optimal matching for ~'.  We will show that/z~ in the 
required matching of the proposition. First, we claim that/z~ is ~-stable. To see 
this note that the woman-optimal matching/zw is still individually rational for ~ '  
and hence also stable for ~'.  Now if w is unmatched under/z~, by Lemma 2 she 
would be unmatched under/z w hence from (6) she would have deleted no men from 
her preference list and hence could not be part of a blocking pair for ~. On the other 
hand, if w is matched by p~,  from (6) she prefers her mate to the men she has 
deleted. Hence she cannot block with any deleted man and hence she belongs to no 
blocking pair. 
Next we show that lZ~<_MIZ* for if p~(m)>mP*(m) and w=p~(m), then 
p*(w) >wm by stability of/z*, but this means from (6) that m was deleted by w so 
w=/z~(rn) is impossible. 
It follows that p(m)>mp~(m) for at least one m for if not we would have 
IZ<_MIUM<Ia *, but since from (7) lZM:~ p this would contradict hat p* was the 
smallest stable matching preferred by M to/z. 
Finally, we apply Hwang's lemma to the preferences ~ '  for which/z~ is man op- 
timal. For ~ '  we are back to the case treated in the first paragraph of the proof so 
there is a blocking pair for p under ~ '  hence under ~ and the proof is complete with 
/2 =/z~ as claimed. 
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